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Abstract
Innovation is one of the most important drivers of economic development.
Even in developing countries, households have access to a wide array of new
technologies. However, factors affecting households’ technology adoption de-
cisions remain poorly understood. Using data on solar microgrid adoption
from rural India, we investigate the determinants of household technology
adoption. We offer all households identical solar products to avoid bias from
product differentiation. Households pay a monthly fee for technology use,
allowing us to abstract away from credit constraints as a barrier to adop-
tion. The results show that household expenditures and savings as well as
the household head’s entrepreneurial attitude are strong predictors of adop-
tion. In contrast, past fuel expenditures, risk acceptance, and community
trust are not associated with technology adoption decisions. These find-
ings suggest new directions for research on the microeconomics of household
technology adoption, which is critical for sustainable development among the
poor in developing countries.
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1. Introduction
How do households decide on the adoption of new technology? Innovation
is one of the most important forces of development (Solow, 1956), and even
very poor households now have access to a wide array of new technologies
in local markets. However, it is far from clear what makes some households
adopt a given technology, but not others. Even when improved household
technologies do not directly enhance productivity, they may contribute to
higher labor market participation, improved health outcomes and educational
attainment (Dinkelman, 2011; World Bank, 2008; Samad et al., 2013). To
understand the economics of household technology adoption, we focus on
the case of improved household lighting through solar power. Households
that do have an electricity connection often have limited hours of access
because of poor quality of supply (Aklin et al., 2016). In the absence of grid
electricity, households in developing countries often rely on unhealthy and
costly alternatives such as kerosene (Lam et al., 2012). When a household
decides on adopting new lighting technology, it must compare the costs of
the new technology to the benefits from fuel savings and improved lighting
quality.
We present a decision-theoretic model that offers an analytical framework
to explain household adoption, and generates testable hypotheses. We test
these hypotheses against technology adoption data from an impact evaluation
study of solar microgrids in rural Uttar Pradesh, India (Aklin et al., 2017).
In a random sample of 49 unelectrified habitations (Indian equivalent for
hamlets), households were provided an opportunity to subscribe to a solar
microgrid service for lighting and mobile charging in exchange for a monthly
fee of 100 rupees (∼US$ 1.5).1 Importantly, the technology offered to rural
villagers was identical for everyone and the fee-based business model of the
technology provider means that we can rule out credit constraints as an
explanation for non-adoption by households.2 Over a 15-month period, we
1Exchange rate of 0.0147 US$ per Indian rupee, as of 20 January 2016.
2Indeed, average monthly household expenditure in our baseline survey was 4,339 ru-
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surveyed the same households over three waves with the solar microgrids
being offered to the households between the first (baseline) and the second
(midline) waves. We also conducted a separate service perception survey
before the midline.
The results shed new light on the microeconomics of household technology
adoption. To begin with, and confirming earlier findings on solar technology
adoption (e.g., Rebane and Barham, 2011; Smith and Urpelainen, 2014), af-
fordability through high household income and savings plays an important
role in household technology adoption. The results also speak to the role
of psychological factors: While risk acceptance is not associated with solar
technology adoption in the sample, household heads that score high on an
entrepreneurial spirit scale are likely to adopt such household technology.
Lastly, our analysis shows that people’s adoption decisions are neither as-
sociated with their trust in companies and business nor with their trust in
other people living in their habitation. Our results are closely related to sev-
eral key studies in the literature on the economics of technology adoption.
Compared to technologies for productive use (Gine´ and Yang, 2009; Duflo
et al., 2011) and learning models (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Bandiera
and Rasul, 2006; Conley and Udry, 2010), we focus on household adoption.
Given the massive health impacts of indoor air pollution due to kerosene use,
the benefits of well-being from efficient cooking and lighting technologies are
huge. In addition, and in line with recent works (Suri, 2011; Duflo et al.,
2008, 2011), our study demonstrates that when potential adopters have a
good understanding of the technology to be adopted, informational barriers
are minimal. Instead what matters are the benefits that the technology can
offer.
2. Background Information
Before presenting the theory, hypotheses, and research design, we briefly
describe the fee-based business model that we studied and describe our sam-
ple.
2.1. Technology and Business Model
The solar power technology under study here is provided by Mera Gao
Power (MGP), an Indian company that installs and maintains small solar
pees, so that the service fee amounts to just about 2% of monthly household spending.
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microgrids in rural Uttar Pradesh. In the firm’s business model, individual
households can subscribe to an electricity access scheme for a monthly fee of
100 rupees (∼US$ 1.5).3 In exchange, the households receive two bright LED
lights and a mobile charger. In this model, MGP generates solar electricity
during the day to charge a central battery and then powers the lights and the
mobile charger at night, usually from 6pm until 10 or 11pm (these hours are
controlled by MGP, not individual households), though hours of access are
shorter during times of limited insolation, such as the peak of the monsoon
and the fog that appears in December/January.
Households within a 100-meter radius of the location of the system (solar
panel and batteries) can subscribe to the service. The household connections
are designed such that only the lights and the mobile charger can be pow-
ered: if households attempt to add other devices, the device disconnects from
the central battery. Thus, detecting abuse and non-cooperative behavior by
households is relatively easy for MGP staff. An important complication con-
cerns MGP’s requirement that at least ten households per habitation need
to subscribe to their service before installation is economically feasible. This
implies that a single household’s willingness to adopt solar power may be in-
sufficient for installation of the microgrid if there is no critical mass of other
households who are also interested in the service.4
2.2. Study Sample and Patterns of Technology Adoption
In India, the 2011 census found that two-thirds of the people (i.e., 400
million individuals) lived in non-electrified households (Government of India,
2011). Among non-electrified households, the most common primary lighting
source was kerosene oil, as 31% of all households (over 90% of non-electrified
households) reported using it as their primary lighting source. Documenting
large variation across Indian states, the situation in rural Uttar Pradesh,
where our data were collected, is much worse. Only 24% of households have
an electricity connection and three out of four households use kerosene for
lighting according to the 2011 census. Barabanki district, where most of our
3Exchange rate of 0.0147 US$ per Indian rupee, as of 20 January 2016.
4While this does not affect the veracity of our model, our empirical estimation strategy
accounts for this complication in two ways. For one, we cluster standard errors in all
our models at the habitation level, which is the relevant geographic unit for microgrid
installation. Second, we estimate our main models not only for the full sample, but also
for the subsample of only those habitations in which MGP microgrids were installed.
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study habitations are, has an even lower rural household electrification rate
of 14%, as per the same 2011 census.
Our sampling strategy is described in Appendix A1 and basic informa-
tion on the habitations surveyed is shown in Appendix A3 (Table A6). We
conducted a baseline survey (February 2014) before administering treatment
(February-July 2017) and followed up with a midline (October 2014) and
an endline survey (June 2015) for all households. In August 2014, we con-
ducted a brief summer survey with only those households who had already
subscribed to the MGP service at the time. Before MGP offered their solar
microgrid to rural villagers in our sample, only 27 out of 778 households in
our baseline had access to grid electricity. With only access to electricity for
a median number of eight hours and about five power outages during the last
30 days, reliability is poor even among those few with electricity. Household
lighting came almost exclusively from kerosene use (96%), with only 4% of
households reporting battery use to power household lights. The availability
of lighting is limited to about five hours of artificial lighting a day. Quality is
also poor, as 80% of households in our baseline survey reported to be either
“unsatisfied” or “very unsatisfied” with the quality of lighting.
By the midline survey, 132 households, accounting for about 17% of our
sample, had registered for the MGP service. These numbers decreased to
92 adopters at the time of our endline survey, most likely due to problems
for solar microgrids to generate sufficient power during the monsoon and fog
seasons in Uttar Pradesh. All adopting households came from 25 out of 49
treatment habitations.5
Lighting is not only important for every household, but weekly household
expenditures on lighting (29.2 rupees) were more than 3.5 times higher than
the money spent on charging mobile phones (7.6 rupees) in our baseline
survey. In our summer survey, which was conducted soon after installations,
only two out of 136 interviewed households report that better mobile charging
was the main reason for subscribing to MGP’s service, compared to 134 others
emphasizing better lighting. Households apparently consider better lighting
as the more important benefit that MGP delivers.
We also have a good understanding of typical household uses of lighting.
Table 1 below summarizes key activities, separately for social/non-economic
5Across survey waves, only 8 households report that they would have liked to adopt,
but could not because of insufficient support by other villagers in the habitation.
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uses and economic uses, which are primarily intended to generate revenue
from selling goods or services in markets. Although not too surprising with
only 65 households being business owners in our sample (8.4%), social and
non-business related uses seem to be of much greater importance. By far
the most important activities that lighting is used for are cooking (99.9%),
meeting with family (98.5%), and going out at night (92.4%).
Social and economic use of lighting from baseline survey (February 2014)
Social/ non-economic activities Economic activities
# Activity HHs (#) HHs (%) # Activity HHs (#) HHs (%)
1 Cooking 777 / 778 99.9% 1 Home business 46 / 778 5.9%
2 Meeting family 766 / 778 98.5% 2 Baking for sale 42 / 778 5.4%
3 Going out at night 719 / 778 92.4% 3 Sale of manufactured goods 30 / 778 3.9%
4 Meeting friends 621 / 778 79.8% 4 Repair services 10 / 778 1.3%
5 Children studying 469 / 606 77.4% 5 Handicraft 3 / 778 0.4%
6 Handle livestock 575 / 778 73.9% 6 Textile decoration 1 / 778 0.1%
7 Studying 484 / 778 62.2%
8 Reading 382 / 778 49.1%
Table 1: The table shows reported use of lighting for social and economic activities from
our baseline survey (February 2014) before treatment was administered.
The latter aspect is particularly interesting, as almost 60% of households
who had adopted MGP service reported in the endline interview that out-
door lighting improved, with the accompanying effects of almost a quarter of
households saying they spend more time outside at night, more community
events are held in the evenings, and almost three out of four households men-
tioned increased safety at night. This matches findings from a short summer
survey which we administered after installations. Table 2 summarizes the re-
sults: Here, out of 136 households which had adopted MGP’s service by the
time of the summer survey, 96 households (70.6%) report that the primary
use of the solar lamps is for outside use, followed by cooking (19%), children
studying (7.4%) and reading (2.9%).
As emphasized above, microgrid use is not capital-intensive for house-
holds, as MGP does not require households to invest in technology itself.
However, the monthly service fee that takes away from disposable income for
other consumptive uses is by no means a trivial charge, especially outside the
harvest season. While it admittedly only accounts for little more than 2% of
household’s monthly average expenditures, households in our baseline survey
report to spend about 120 rupees for lighting fuels. Drawing on additional
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Lighting uses from summer survey (August 2014)
# Activity HHs (#) HHs (%)
1 Outside use 96 / 136 70.6%
2 Cooking 26 / 136 19.1%
3 Children studying 10 / 136 7.3%
4 Reading 4 / 136 2.9%
Table 2: The table shows reported lighting use among MGP adopters from a summer
survey (August 2014) that was conducted to assess customer experience and satisfaction
with the MGP service right after the intervention was completed.
information from our survey data, the primary reason for more than half of
the households not having adopted the MGP service is cost. Table 3 shows
that the service fee is much more an impediment for adoption than, for exam-
ple, concerns related to MGP as service provider, alternative solar or battery
lighting options, or various other reasons.6 Therefore, experimenting with
adopting the new technology is by no means costless, but involves a trade-off
for each household. Solar lighting is furthermore not a perfect substitute for
kerosene, which is also used for cooking and highly subsidized through the
public distribution system, biasing against new technology adoption.
Reasons for MGP non-adoption from midline (October 2014) and endline
surveys (June 2015)
# Reason N Share
1 Cost 228 54%
2 Problem with MGP 101 24%
3 Other electricity/lighting option 62 15%
4 Other reason 28 7%
Total 419 100%
Table 3: The table shows main reasons reported by households for not having adopted
MGP service. Responses come from both the midline (October 2014) and endline surveys
(June 2015). Questions were open-ended and we then classified responses by general
theme.
In our data, we see about one-third of subscribing households stopping
subscription between the midline and the endline, while ‘loyal’ customers
6In particular, we do not find any evidence in our survey data that households are
biased against adoption because they do not perceive MGP as a caste-neutral provider.
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remain satisfied with the service. Table 4 supports this interpretation as
the primary reasons for discontinuing MGP service resulted from conflicts
with MGP (65%), e.g., over billing, or the quality of lighting (27%). On the
one hand, the single most important reason for discontinuation was dissatis-
faction with the way MGP conducted the business and interacted with the
customers. On the other hand, every fourth customer also complained about
lighting quality. Here we note that the foggy season, during which sunlight
is reduced to a minimum in December and January, fell between our midline
and endline surveys. The reduced availability of electricity at that time could
explain why the subscriptions fell between these two survey waves.
Reasons for discontinuation of MGP service from midline (October 2014)
and endline surveys (June 2015)
# Reason N Share
1 Conflict with MGP 32 65%
2 Quality 13 27%
3 Cost 2 4%
4 Conflict with neighbors 1 2%
5 Other 1 2%
Total 49 100%
Table 4: The table shows the main reasons given by households for discontinuing the MGP
service. Responses come from both the midline (October 2014) and endline surveys (June
2015). Questions were open-ended and we then classified responses by general theme.
3. Methodology and Research Design
In this section, we first present a model of household technology adop-
tion in order to motivate and formally derive the hypotheses we test against
adoption data from our field experiment. The second part then presents the
research design, the econometric model specification, and measurement of
key variables.
3.1. Model of Household Technology Adoption
Our model focuses on technology adoption of an individual household.
Specifically, we consider the adoption decision of a solar microgrid as a means
to power household lighting from a renewable energy source. The base-
line model characterizes a household’s energy demand when only kerosene is
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available as a lighting fuel. In the literature on household energy, the house-
hold can thus be thought of as reaching the first step of the “energy ladder”
(Masera et al., 2000; Cheng and Urpelainen, 2014). In a second step, we then
compare this baseline demand to a case when solar microgrids are added to
the household’s choice set as a renewable energy alternative. Finally, we
extend the model further to account for the importance of community trust
in the adoption of network resources, such as community solar microgrids.
Comparative statics are derived from equilibrium energy consumption for
household lighting.
3.1.1. Baseline Model of Kerosene Consumption
Following the literature on solar technology adoption (e.g., Komatsu et al.,
2011; Smith and Urpelainen, 2014), the household chooses optimal consump-
tion levels of kerosene k as an energy source and a numeraire good n. Market
prices for these goods are denoted pk and pn, respectively, and the household
is assumed to be a price taker. As usual, only relative prices matter, so we
normalize the numeraire price to pn = 1.
Given our interest in household lighting technology adoption, a household
is not interested in kerosene consumption per se, but in the lighting output
that kerosene use generates. We model lighting output l as
l(k) = αf(k), (1)
where α > 0 is an efficiency parameter of lighting production and f is an
increasing, strictly concave, and smooth function. Household lighting output
has decreasing returns to scale.
Further, let the household’s objective function U be given as
U =
∑
i∈I
Bi(l;h)−
∑
j∈J
Hj(k;h) + n. (2)
Lighting benefits are captured by Bi, which are increasing, strictly concave,
and well-behaved functions over the set of benefits I. Since artificial light-
ing at night is a critical input for productive household activities in many
developing countries’ rural communities, profits from these activities are an
explicit element of the sub-utilities Bi; when a household runs a business, we
could have Bi′ = Π(l; ·) with i′ ∈ I, where Π denotes household profits.
Functions Hj are also increasing and well-behaved, but strictly convex
in k, as they capture the negative effects from kerosene use, like indoor air
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pollution. Vector h denotes a set of household characteristics, for instance,
household size, and all functions Bi and Hj are increasing in every single
element of h. Benefits from lighting are (local) public goods for household
members, while damages from kerosene use are household public bads, so
that this simplifying assumption is plausible.
Given a household’s budget constraint pkk + n = X, optimal kerosene
and numeraire consumption levels k∗ and n∗ are implicitly characterized in
equilibrium by the following two first-order conditions:7∑
i∈I
∂Bi(l;h)
∂l
αf ′(k)−
∑
j∈J
Hj(k;h)
∂k
− pk = 0 and n∗ = X − pkk∗. (3)
3.1.2. Model with Solar Power Technology
In the extended model in which a household can choose to adopt solar
power for household lighting, lighting output depends on kerosene input k
and solar power input s, so that
l(k,A) = αf(k) + βsI(A = 1), (4)
where β > 0 is a strictly positive efficiency parameter and I is an indicator
function which scores one whenever the household adopts solar power, A = 1;
the lighting production function reduces to equation (1) if the household
continues to exclusively rely on kerosene for home lighting. Notably, s is a
fixed quantity determined by the output generated from the solar microgrid,
so that households demanding lighting output l > l(k = 0, A = 1) are
going to still consume a positive quantity of kerosene even after adopting
solar power. This is a distinctive feature of solar microgrids, which typically
cannot meet a household’s entire energy need and do not produce enough
electricity for productive loads.
The literature on solar technology adoption highlights asymmetric infor-
mation as a key issue (Rebane and Barham, 2011; Bollinger and Gillingham,
2012; Lay et al., 2013; Smith and Urpelainen, 2014; Urpelainen and Yoon,
2015). As solar power is a new technology to villagers, we assume incomplete
information about the efficiency parameter β from a distribution function F
with positive support [β, β] and standard deviation σβ such that
σβ = σ + σ(N ;N). (5)
7The third first-order condition from the quasi-linear Lagrangian is simply λ = 1.
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Here, σ denotes individual-specific, idiosyncratic uncertainty which always
persists, while σ(N ;N) captures the variability in F which is decreasing
as a function of the number of other adopting households N ; N is then
a technology-specific number of adopters needed to drive this component of
household uncertainty to zero, as a result of learning (Foster and Rosenzweig,
1995; Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Conley and Udry, 2010).8
To account for the possibility that households in rural villages may de-
cide to start their own business once solar power becomes available, we again
model potential business profits Π as part of the expected utility stream a
household obtains from lighting l. As before, where profits for existing busi-
ness owners are simply modeled as an additional component in a household’s
benefit stream, the difference between a household that anticipates to take
up a business and who does not would again be the size of the benefit set
I over which sub-utilities are added up. For any given set I prior to solar
adoption, a household’s set of sub-utilities could be written as {I}∪{i′} with
Bi′ = Π(l; ·) when a household expects to start its own business, increasing
the cardinality of the new, union set by one. Taking up a business because
of better access to solar lighting through solar microgrids, in our model, can
simply be accounted for by extending the set of benefits from lighting. All
else equal, the expectation of future profits from business ownership hence
provides households with one more benefit component over the aggregated
benefit stream when they calculate total expected utility from technology
adoption.
Recognizing uncertainty about the efficiency of solar lighting through
microgrids, as captured by β, a household’s expected utility function when
adopting solar power is given as
E[U ] =
∫ ∑
i∈I
Bi(l;h) dF (β)−
∑
j∈J
Hj(k;h) + n. (6)
Keeping the notation from above and given a household’s modified budget
constraint pkk + ps + n = X, where ps denotes the adoption fee for solar
8Technically, we have σ → 0 if N → N . Even though we will not be able to test this
particular aspect of the model because we have too few time periods in our panel data
set, our theoretical model is more general and would allow modeling learning dynamics in
household technology adoption. Since N varies with technology, the model can produce
equilibrium predictions for technology adoption for more than two alternatives.
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power, which is a fixed cost and thus independent of the amount of solar
power consumed, the following two implicit functions characterize optimal
levels of kerosene and numeraire consumption kˆ and nˆ when a household
decides to adopt solar power:9∑
i∈I
E
[
∂Bi(l;h)
∂l
]
αf ′(k)−
∑
j∈J
∂Hj(k;h)
∂k
−pk = 0 and nˆ = X−pkkˆ−ps.
(7)
3.1.3. Model with Solar Power Technology and Community Trust
A distinctive feature of solar microgrids in our context is the community
aspect of technology adoption. Solar power can only effectively be provided
if none of the households—be they adopters or non-adopters—overuses the
community grid, steals electricity, or tampers with the wiring of the system.
Moreover, the potential adopters must consider the service provider’s trust-
worthiness regarding service and payments. Solar microgrids are a prime
example of what is considered a collective good (Olson, 1965; Cornes and
Sandler, 1986) with network characteristics (Katz and Shapiro, 1985). Al-
though the consumption of solar lighting does not require active cooperation,
each subscriber and non-subscriber must refrain from behaving in a way that
would prompt the service provider to exit the market.
Given this dilemma, after adoption and upon payment of the service fee,
the benefits from solar power do not accrue with complete certainty. Instead,
benefit streams depend on each household’s beliefs about the “trustworthi-
ness” (Coleman, 1988; Hardin, 2002) of the company providing the service
and other people in the community. This trust parameter θ ∈ [0, 1] scales
expected benefits and is assumed to be exogenous and household-specific. It
is best thought of as a Bayesian prior, that is, as a household’s subjective
probability on a state of the world in which other households in the commu-
nity would engage in any activity that puts uninterrupted and continuous
provision of solar power at risk. Low levels of community trust could thus
bias against technology uptake as adoption becomes a riskier choice due to
less certain benefits.
Although this requires only a slight change in the household’s objective
9As before, the third first-order condition yields λ = 1 because of the quasi-linearity in
the Lagrangian.
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function
E[U ] = θ
∫ ∑
i∈I
Bi(l;h) dF (β)−
∑
j∈J
Hj(k;h) + n, (8)
the modification breaks new ground in two important ways. Theoretically,
it helps generalize our setup to account for network resources. Empirically,
it allows us to model technology adoption as a function of household-level
prior beliefs about community trust.
3.1.4. Optimal Technology Adoption
In equilibrium, optimal technology adoption A∗ for a household is deter-
mined by the following decision rule
A∗ =
{
1 E
[
U(kˆ, nˆ; θ)
]
> U(k∗, n∗)
0 otherwise,
(9)
where the new technology is adopted if and only if the expected utility from
the optimal consumption profile (kˆ, nˆ) under solar power adoption is strictly
larger than the utility from the consumption of equilibrium levels of kerosene
and the numeraire (k∗, n∗) without adopting solar power.
So far, we have shown that households consume kerosene in both cases up
to levels at which (expected) marginal benefits net of marginal costs equal
exogenous market prices pk. A household’s adoption decision then depends
on four effects: a substitution effect, an uncertainty effect, a consumption
effect, and a trust effect.
The substitution effect captures reductions in kerosene use after a house-
hold adopts solar power adoption. This reduction results from the fact that
the same equilibrium lighting output without solar microgrids l∗ can now be
generated with strictly less kerosene input than before. Since kerosene use
is hazardous, substitution away from it confers utility to the household from
solar power adoption. The uncertainty effect comes from households not
knowing the efficiency parameter β for sure, which stacks the deck against
adoption of solar power due to the concavity in household utility. The con-
sumption effect arises from the need to possibly give up some consumption of
the numeraire n∗ if the reduction in kerosene use due to solar power adoption
does not free up enough of a household’s budget to fund the fixed fee of the
microgrid ps. Finally, the trust effect matters for technology adoption as a
household’s prior belief about community trust affects the probability with
which benefits from solar power materialize.
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3.1.5. Comparative Statics
Here we derive comparative statics for four different quantities of inter-
est: changes in the budget constraint, in a household’s business activity, in
uncertainty about the efficiency of solar technology, and in community trust.
These are presented and discussed in turn to formulate testable hypotheses
for the empirical analysis.
Budget constraint: As we assume a household’s utility function to be
quasi-linear, optimal consumption levels of kerosene k are independent of
the budget. By implication, relaxing the budget constraint leaves kerosene
consumption unaffected, so that a non-adopting household continues to con-
sume k = k∗ as long as this consumption level can be funded (X ≥ pkk∗) and
remains the utility-maximizing choice even in the case of a corner solution,
i.e., U(k∗, 0) > U(0, n∗).
Still, higher disposable income to fund the new technology makes adop-
tion of solar power more likely, at least if the increase in utility from adoption
per unit of money spent outweighs the increased utility from consuming the
numeraire good. As the return in per money units spent from numeraire
consumption is always one, solar power adoption becomes more likely when
the following inequality holds:∑
i∈I θE
[
Bi
(
αf(k∗) + βs;h
)]
−∑i∈I Bi(αf(k∗);h)
ps
> 1 (10)
At this level of generality, assessing whether this condition is met is impossi-
ble and depends on the specific application. However, in our case, where we
assume households to be energy poor, it seems reasonable that even small
increases in access to lighting have (comparatively) strong effects in the util-
ity response function; this is particularly so, given the concave nature of
sub-utilities Bi. Similar to earlier studies (Jacobson, 2007; Lay et al., 2013;
Smith and Urpelainen, 2014), we thus expect to find empirical support for
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (Adoption and budget constraint).
Richer households with less binding budget constraints are more likely to
adopt new technology in the form of solar microgrids, if offered.
Business activity: No matter whether a household already engages
in business activity prior to technology adoption or whether a household
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envisions to start its own business after new lighting technology becomes
available, in both cases the set of household benefits, defined as the union
set B ≡ ∪iBi, for such a household is strictly larger than for an otherwise
comparable household who does not run its own business. The demand for
lighting l is thus increasing in the cardinality of B. As adopting solar power
can increase lighting output to meet higher demand, while at the same time
not driving up hazardous damages as kerosene would, solar adoption becomes
more likely for households already running or planning to run their own
business, that is, for households with strong entrepreneurial spirit. We will
test this hypothesis against our data of solar power adoption in rural India.
Hypothesis 2 (Adoption and business activity).
Households already running a business or entrepreneurial households aspir-
ing to do so are more likely to adopt new technology in the form of solar
microgrids, if offered.
Risk aversion: Lighting output l from solar power depends on the effi-
ciency parameter β, which is unknown to households as β ∼ F[β,β](µβ, σβ).
Adopting solar power is therefore a risky choice. We further assumed that
lighting benefits Bi are strictly concave and additive in E
[∑
i∈I Bi(l;h)
]
;
households are hence risk averse in lighting benefits, which biases against
solar power adoption. This allows formulating the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 (Adoption and risk aversion).
Less risk averse households are more likely to adopt new technology in the
form of solar microgrids, if offered.
Community trust: With solar microgrids being a network resource, the
likelihood with which benefits from solar power adoption materialize depends
on a household’s individual expectation about other households’ behavior.
For high levels of community trust, θ takes on high values and drives up
expected benefits from technology adoption. We thus expect a positive rela-
tionship between community trust and adoption of solar microgrids.
Hypothesis 4 (Business and community trust).
Households with more trust in their community are more likely to adopt new
technology in the form of solar microgrids, if offered.
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Kerosene market prices: Kerosene market prices pk are exogenously given
and rural households are assumed price takers. As market prices increase, the
derived first-order conditions in equations (3) and (7) no longer hold. House-
holds then adjust their consumption behavior by reducing the amount of
kerosene consumed, which brings down the summed damages
∑
j∈J Hj(k;h),
but also summed (expected) benefits from lighting. However, because of the
convexity and concavity assumptions, respectively, damages decrease more
quickly than benefits, balancing the first-order conditions again. Reduc-
tions in kerosene consumption for non-adopting households must always be
larger than for households already using solar power as solar mircogrids offer
an alternative lighting source. This has to be so as households with solar
mircogrids use strictly less kerosene to begin with. To obtain output l, for
example, non-adopting households consume k = f−1
(
l
α
)
, while adopting
households only require k = f−1
(
l−βs
α
)
, which is strictly smaller. Reducing
consumption levels from k to k, requires thus less adjustment by house-
holds already using the new technology. If, however, upon spiking prices in
kerosene markets, non-adopting households were to reduce consumption and,
as a consequence, lighting output, too, this is when adopting solar mircogrids
becomes more attractive. This underlies why price increases in kerosene mar-
kets make the adoption of solar mircogrids more likely, which we also test
below.
Hypothesis 5 (Adoption and kerosene market prices).
Increases in kerosene market prices make households more likely to adopt
new technology in the form of solar mircogrids, if offered.
3.2. Research Design
To test the model, we use original data from a field experiment with dis-
tributed solar power in rural Uttar Pradesh, India (Aklin et al., 2017). While
the goal of the field experiment was to evaluate the impacts of distributed
solar power, here we use data on adoption behavior in habitations that were
offered access (N = 49) to household electricity through solar microgrids.
The study was conducted in three waves over the course of almost one year
from September 2014 to June 2015 (see Appendix A1 for details). As in our
formal model above, the unit of analysis is a household in a survey wave. We
estimate both panel and cross-sectional models (by survey) to predict adop-
tion rates of solar power for household use. In total, our sample comprises a
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maximum of 765 households in the midline and 777 households in the endline
survey, from 49 different habitations.10 We estimate logistic regressions and
linear probability models to explain household adoption decisions of solar
technology.
By focusing on the adoption of solar power provided through MGP micro-
grids in the context of a controlled randomized trial, our empirical analysis
benefits from several advantages. First, and most important, we can mea-
sure the dependent variable of technology adoption accurately, which ensures
comparability of household decisions. Second, the experimental nature of the
study minimizes possible contamination which could result, for instance, from
households being offered access to other or similar forms of solar technology
from competing providers. Third, our initial baseline survey, which was con-
ducted pre-treatment in February 2014, reveals that 96% of all households
in our sample use kerosene lamps for household lighting. This is key as once
MGP started offering households access to solar microgrids, the adoption
decision that households needed to make (as in our formal model above) was
truly dichotomous. Fourth, offering energy-deprived households an alterna-
tive form of household lighting makes for a very real adoption choice; this
decision impacts everyday lives, and so rural villagers are likely to seriously
consider this offer, making revealed behavior meaningful.11 Finally, the em-
pirical analysis, to our knowledge, is the first to study technology adoption
of energy by individual households for its social benefits rather than tech-
nology adoption of, for example, new fertilizers by rural farmers to increase
agricultural yields.
3.2.1. Model Specification
In our empirical analysis, we estimate logistic panel regressions:
Logit(Yit) = α + βXi,pre + εit, (11)
where for household i and survey wave t = {midline, endline}, Yi,t = {0, 1}
is a time-varying indicator variable for whether a household had subscribed
to the MGP service or not. The household-specific vector of covariates Xi,pre
10In the field experiment we tried to offer solar power to 54 habitations, but in five of
them flooding prevented us from doing so. Because households in these households could
not adopt even if they wanted, these habitations are excluded from the study sample.
11Only 27 households out of 778 (about 3.5%) in the baseline survey report to have a
grid connection.
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is measured pre-treatment during our baseline survey to avoid simultaneity
bias; α denotes the intercept, β captures the vector of slope coefficients, and
εit is the error term. As households live in different habitations, we cluster
standard errors at the habitation level.
To show the robustness of our main results, we estimate panel regressions
also as linear probability models (Appendix A5), separately for midline and
endline cross-sections (Appendix A6), models with village-level fixed-effects
(Appendix A7), and conduct subsample analyses(Appendix A8), without
substantial changes to our results.
3.2.2. Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether household i is
subscribing to the MGP service at time t. During the time of the baseline
survey, in which we collected a battery of household data, no household had
access to this service. This is important as it safeguards our analysis against
confounding, and hence allows us to use these baseline data as pre-treatment
covariates.
3.2.3. Main Explanatory and Control Variables
We differentiate our main models below by the set of explanatory variables
which we include. The first model only includes basic indicators of disposable
income and wealth. More specifically, we include measures from our survey on
household expenditures and household savings, both measured in rupees per
month; we logarithmize both variables to account for the skewed distribution
income variables typically have. We also add a dummy variable on whether
a household is indebted or not.
As a second set of variables, we include a variable for how entrepreneurial
a household is, a binary indicator for business ownership, and a measure
for revealed risk aversion. We measure entrepreneurial spirit as an additive
index of responses to the following eleven true-false questions: I am at ease
handling difficult situations; I do not mind uncertain monthly income; I do
not irregular monthly income; I believe that I can change my own future; I
appreciate having the final say; I do not have a problem making decisions; I
can easily deal with stress; I am willing to make sacrifices to succeed; I like to
lead others; I am not scared starting anew; I get difficult tasks done rather
now than later. We consider entrepreneurial spirit as a latent trait of an
individual, such as a household head, that is related but not identical to risk
acceptance. Drawing on Schumpeterian insights into the role of entrepreneurs
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and “creative destruction” in capitalist economies (Schumpeter, 2003 [1943]),
the literature on entrepreneurship finds this latent trait to be an important
predictor of engagement in business creation, and thus creating economic
growth (Doepke and Zilibotti, 2005; Galor and Michalopoulos, 2012). In
our baseline sample, households reporting an interest in opening a business
in the future (about 60% of our sample) score significantly higher on our
entrepreneurial spirit index than household heads without such interest (6.75
to 5.66, with t = 6.086).
Business ownership is a simple dummy variable coded one whenever a
household runs its own business. In our baseline data, less than 10% of
households were running their own business.12 These households also score
higher in terms of entrepreneurial spirit than those who run a business only
part-time, but business owners as a whole are comparable to households with-
out their own business.13 Important for our purposes, only two households
work at night, and both agree that better lighting would help their business,
which suggests that lacking access to lighting limits households’ economic
productivity and output.
We measure risk aversion from a choice experiment which we conducted
as part of our survey. We prompted survey responses with the hypothetical
choice between a payment of 3,000 rupees for sure and a lottery with expected
values of 3,250 rupees, 3,500 rupees, and 4,000 rupees, respectively, where we
increased the expected offer for those households which would reject the safe
option. We then use reported behavior to these choices to classify households
on a 1-4 scale from risk loving to very risk-averse; higher values denote more
risk aversion. While several approaches on how to elicit risk aversion exist
(Holt and Laury, 2002), survey-based menus of hypothetical paired choices
have a long tradition, especially in the context of development economics
(Dillon and Scandizzo, 1978). Most important for our context, almost a
third of households in our sample can be classified as risk loving, which
12Out of 65 business owners, two-thirds were active in selling goods in markets, while ten
were active in dairy and cooking, five in the repair business and another five in handicraft
and textiles. On average, business activity accounts for 46% of household income, while
29 households report that their own business is the main source of income.
13The small number of business owners limits further analysis, but descriptively the
entrepreneurial spirit variable is 5.66 (part-time business owners) and 6.03 (main income
business owners) and 5.83 (business owners) and 6.31 (no business owners). None of these
differences are statistically significant in two-tailed t-tests.
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alleviates the typical concern of over-representing risk aversion in reported
over revealed behavior measures (Binswanger, 1980). Acknowledging that
comparing measures of risk aversion is beyond the scope of this paper, we
primarily introduce our measure of risk aversion as an explanatory variable
into our econometric model as we seek to tease out differences in adoption
behavior due to household entrepreneurship and risk aversion. As Guiso and
Paiella (2008: 1109) find that individuals “who are more likely to face income
uncertainty ... exhibit a higher degree of absolute risk aversion,” separating
these two influences on technology adoption seems well founded.
To test our expectations about community trust, we use two trust mea-
sures from our survey. In our theoretical model, community trust affects the
likelihood with which a household expects to obtain benefits from adopting
solar microgrids. Interestingly for our empirical application, we can distin-
guish between targets of trust. For one, households may be concerned about
the trustworthiness of other households in the habitation, which makes adop-
tion of the new technology less attractive. On the other hand, households
may also be concerned about the trustworthiness of the service provider, that
is, the business which operates the new technology. In our case, if households
do not trust MGP, they should be less likely to adopt MGP’s solar powered
microgrids. To empirically test for these differences, we construct two in-
dices, both on a 1-5 scale with higher values denoting “more trust.” The
first index averages household responses to questions related to general trust
in people in the habitation and trust in people from the same religion and
caste as well as from another religion and caste.14 The second index records
the mean of household responses for trust in large companies, small firms,
and local enterprises to capture household trust towards firms.15 As we are
not sure whether households think of MGP as a large, a small, or a local
firm, averaging responses produces the most reliable measure.
Extending the set of variables further, we include variables for previous
lighting solutions at home. These entail the monthly amounts of rupees
14Specifically, we asked the following five questions for trust in people: (1) Do you trust
the other people in your hamlet? (2) Do you trust people of other religion? (3) Do you
trust people of your religion? (4) Do you trust people from your own caste? (5) Do you
trust people from other castes?
15The three questions for trust in firms were as follows: (1) Do you trust large compa-
nies? (2) Do you trust small companies? (3) Do you trust companies operating in this
area?
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spent (logged) for buying kerosene both from the public distribution system
(PDS), where prices are highly subsidized, and the private (black) market
(Rao, 2012). Controlling for kerosene expenditures is critical as kerosene is
typically the primary lighting source in rural communities; in fact, 96% of
households in our sample are using it for their lighting at home. Kerosene
on the public, subsidized market is cheaper, but households can only obtain
fixed amounts which are rarely sufficient to cover a household’s full lighting
demand. A vast majority of 85% of households buy kerosene from the PDS,
spending about 37 rupees a month, but also from the private market, where
expenditures, on average, are almost twice as high. As efficient lighting
technologies, like solar microgrids, are to reduce the need to supplement
kerosene from the public distribution system, we expect households with
high kerosene bills from the private market to be sympathetic to technology
adoption.
An electrification dummy controls for whether households have already
access to some form of electricity (including lighting amongst other forms of
electricity access) as this clearly affects adoption behavior of the solar micro-
grid. As mentioned before, only 4% of households in the sample reported to
have electricity access in the baseline interview.
Finally, variables of household characteristics and subjective perceptions
are included. We control for the number of household members to account
for household size, the age of the household head, the household head’s num-
ber of school years, and two dummy variables for whether a household head
is from a scheduled or backward caste, mainly because previous research has
shown that these variables affect technology adoption (Bandiera and Ra-
sul, 2006; Gine´ and Yang, 2009; Koundouri et al., 2006). Aside from these
household characteristics, perceptional measures are added to some of our
model specifications. Adesina and Zinnah (1993), for example, show that
farmers’ perceptions of technology specific attributes are critical for under-
standing adoption decisions of rice varieties in Sierra Leone. This is in line
with psychological research, which also attests to the importance of atti-
tudes towards technologies (Morris and Venkatesh, 2000). We hence control
for lighting satisfaction and perceived benefits from solar power. These data
come specifically from survey questions on (i) how satisfied the household is
with its current lighting situation (5-point scale) and (ii) whether (or not)
a household agrees to the statement that solar power can decrease monthly
lighting expenditures (0-1 measure).
Summary statistics of all explanatory variables for the full sample are
21
in Table 5 below, while we report summary statistics separately by installa-
tion and adoption status in Appendix A3. Table 6 shows trends in means
for main, time-varying variables for the three different surveys. When com-
paring pre-treatment summary statistics from our baseline survey, we find
habitations that ultimately ended up subscribing to MGP’s service to spend
significantly less on kerosene from the PDS (32.68 vs 42.37 rupees, t = 4.60),
but significantly more on kerosene from private markets (77.60 vs 65.40 ru-
pees, t = 2.66); this aligns well with the logic discussed above. Household
heads in habitations with installed MGP service are also almost two years
older (39.6 vs 37.7 years, t = 2.04), have almost one year less education (2.42
vs 3.34 years, t = 3.13) compared to habitations without solar microgrids,
and are more likely to come from a backward caste (0.68 vs 0.58, t = 2.86).
Summary statistics
Mean SD Min Max #
HH expenditures (rupees/month, log) 8.24 0.54 6 10 778
HH savings (rupees/month, log) 4.47 3.37 0 9 778
HH in debt 0.49 0.50 0 1 778
Entrepreneurial spirit 6.27 2.45 0 11 778
Business owner 0.08 0.28 0 1 778
Risk aversion (experiment) 2.69 1.31 1 4 778
Trust in people (index) 3.55 0.79 1 5 778
Trust in firms (index) 2.98 1.13 1 5 778
Kerosene spending (PDS, rupees/month, log) 3.17 1.35 0 6 778
Kerosene spending (private, rupees/month, log) 3.30 1.99 0 6 778
HH electrification 0.03 0.18 0 1 778
HH size (#) 4.79 2.13 1 12 778
Age of HH head 38.70 13.27 18 82 778
School years of HH head 2.87 4.14 0 17 778
Scheduled caste 0.25 0.43 0 1 778
Backward caste 0.64 0.48 0 1 778
Lighting satisfaction 1.96 0.83 1 5 778
Solar power decreases lighting cost 0.76 0.43 0 1 778
Table 5: Summary statistics for main variables. All variables are measured pre-treatment
and come from the baseline survey (February 2014). Non-logged means in US$ with an
exchange rate of 0.0147 US$ per Indian rupee, as of 20 January 2016, are $63.79 (HH
expenditures), $12.68 (HH nominal savings), $0.55 (PDS kerosene spending), and $1.05
(private market kerosene spending).
Within habitations that adopted MGP service, adopting households have
higher monthly household expenditures of about 450 rupees (8.31 vs 8.19
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(logged) rupees, t = 2.08) and save about 120% more per month (5.11 vs
4.32 (logged) rupees, t = 2.22). They are also more entrepreneurial, with
scores of 6.60 over 5.90 on a 0-11 scale (t = 2.81), hold more positive views of
solar power in terms of the technology’s potential to reduce monthly lighting
expenses (0.84 vs 0.73, t = 2.48), and more likely to come from a backward
caste (0.74 vs 0.65, t = 1.96)
Summary statistics by survey
Baseline Midline Endline
February 2014 October 2014 June 2015
HH expenditures (rupees/month, log) 8.23 8.06 8.04
HH savings (rupees/month, log) 4.46 1.88 1.93
HH in debt 0.49 0.46 0.54
Business owner 0.08 0.06 0.06
Trust in people (index) 3.54 3.65 3.75
Trust in firms (index) 2.97 3.41 3.38
Kerosene spending (PDS, rupees/month, log) 3.16 2.98 3.38
Kerosene spending (private, rupees/month, log) 3.29 2.13 1.57
HH electrification 0.03 0.39 0.41
Lighting satisfaction 1.96 3.30 3.40
Solar power decreases lighting cost 0.76 0.81 0.72
Table 6: Mean values of main variables by survey, separately for baseline (February 2014,
N = 778), midline (October 2014, N = 765), and endline surveys (June 2015, N = 777).
4. Results
In this results section, we first discuss descriptive findings that show how
many key variables of interest change over the duration of the study peri-
ods. We then present our econometric results for household solar microgrid
adoption.
4.1. Descriptive Findings
Overall, 136 households adopted the MGP service. Of these, 132 reported
being customers in our first post-treatment interviews, and 4 more had joined
when we conducted our last survey. Between the second and third wave, 47
households canceled their contract with MGP.
Adopters and non-adopters differed in several respects. Table 7 reports
summary statistics separately for adopters and non-adopters, both pre- and
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post-treatment. Adopters were wealthier and had more savings. They had
a stronger entrepreneurial spirit and spent more on kerosene on the private
market. At the same time, based on these simple differences, we also note
that the two groups were also similar in important ways: a similar share of
people owned businesses, their household head was about the same age, and
they were about equally satisfied about their lighting situation. To provide
a more precise analysis of these differences, we next discuss our econometric
results.
The before-after comparisons by group reveal a two notable temporal
trends. First, household monthly savings decrease in both groups over time,
possibly because the fiscal year 2014-2015 was particularly bad one for Uttar
Pradesh agriculture. Second, overall electrification rates increase from 3% to
31% even among non-adopters, mostly because use of both non-MGP solar
products and batteries grows rapidly.
4.2. Econometric Results
The results from the panel data analysis are shown in Table 8, with
models differentiated by the set of included covariates. Models (1)-(4) use
household-level adoption data from all 49 habitations, in which MGP service
was offered. Due to low demand, microgrids were however not installed in all
habitations, so models (5)-(8) replicate the analysis for habitations in which
a microgrid was indeed installed.
Estimating models with habitation fixed effects is only partially useful in
our setting, because we would lose all those habitations where either (i) no
MGP system was installed (24 habitations) or (ii) we did not end up having
at least one adopting household in our sample of interviewed respondents.16
The latter was the case for five out of 25 habitations and dropping these
observations would clearly bias our results. Nonetheless, to reduce unob-
served heterogeneity across habitations, in models (5)-(8) we re-estimate our
main models for the subsample of only those 25 habitations in which MGP
microgrids were installed.
All coefficients are given as odds-ratios and capture the effect of a variable
on the probability of technology adoption relative to the probability of non-
adoption. Accordingly, we test whether the odds-ratio (i.e., exponentiated
16Appendix A3 (Table A6) provides further information on installation and adoption
rates by habitation.
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coefficient) is equal to 1. This translates into adoption and non-adoption
being equally likely, which is identical to an estimated coefficient of zero in
standard coefficients. The simple monotone transformation from standard
coefficients into odds-ratios makes the substantive interpretation of coeffi-
cients in non-linear logistic regressions much easier.
Focusing on the full sample first, which includes both habitations that
adopted MGP solar microgrids and those in which there was no installation
because of lacking demand, we find strong empirical support for our first hy-
pothesis. Richer households are indeed more likely to adopt solar power, and
at highly statistically significant levels (p < 0.05 throughout all models). Us-
ing monthly household expenditures and savings as measures for disposable
income, we find that doubling these two variables increases the odds (ratio
of success to failure) of technology adoption (holding all variables at their
means) by 129-159% for household expenditures and by 19-23% for increases
in savings.
This finding hints at critical income and wealth effects for household
adoption of new technology. While similar effects have been found for the
adoption of sunflower seeds or new irrigation systems (Bandiera and Rasul,
2006; Koundouri et al., 2006), adoption of household lighting technology
compared to these more productive uses may also be impeded by budget
constraints. Somewhat surprisingly, income and wealth effects occur even
though households should be able to recoup the MGP service fee of 100
rupees by saving a substantial share of their expenses on lighting, which are
reported to amount on average to 116 rupees per month on average. Most
likely, however, MGP services alone cannot cover a household’s full lighting
demand. Since MGP offers two lights, a large family may need additional
lighting; moreover, households may continue to use a kerosene lantern when
going outside, as the MGP lights are not wireless. Given low correlations of
expenditures, savings, and whether a household is indebted or not, the latter
does not seem to be correlated with adoption behavior.
While we do not find evidence for a robust association between household
business and MGP service—most certainly due to little variation in business
ownership, with only 8.4% running their own business in our pre-treatment
survey—there is strong empirical support that more entrepreneurially minded
households are more likely to sign up for solar microgrids. When the en-
trepreneurial index goes up by one unit, the odds of adoption increase by
19-26%.
Our data allows us to distinguish between the effects of entrepreneurship
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and risk aversion on adoption behavior. As reported above, there is con-
siderable evidence that business aspirations matter, whereas we do not find
such an effect for risk aversion. Coefficients for risk aversion are consistently
negative across models (that is, smaller than 1 in odds-ratio models), but
fail to become statistically significant. This effect cannot be attributed to
too little variation in our risk-aversion measure (Binswanger, 1980), with
a third of our respondents being classified into the most risk-loving cate-
gory. Substantively, we surmise that this result, which contrasts with some
of the earlier literature, is driven by respondents in our sample having a
good understanding of solar technology already. After all, the benefits of the
MGP service are easy to demonstrate and entail little uncertainty, at least
far less as when compared to high-yield fertilizers or more complex technical
solutions. For example, more than 7 out of 10 villagers in the study knew
someone using solar power and the vast majority of respondents answered
that solar power improves both the quality (98.7%) and reliability (96.6%)
of lighting. This suggests that risk aversion resulting from uncertainty about
the benefits from the technology on offer is unlikely to be an impediment to
technology adoption for well understood and established technologies (Duflo
et al., 2008).
The null results on different types of trust are also interesting. If anything,
the exponentiated coefficient is below 1: higher levels of trust in companies
and people in the habitation are associated with lower likelihood of technol-
ogy adoption. However, the confidence intervals around the estimates are
so wide that in both cases the 95% confidence intervals cover the odds ratio
of 1. Given this uncertainty, the most natural interpretation is that varia-
tion in trust cannot explain technology adoption decisions. Although both
abuse and other forms of non-cooperative behavior are possible in principle,
in practice households do not see these threats as serious concerns. This is
consistent with the notion that MGP has been successful in preventing abuse
in the form of power theft or use of unauthorized devices.
Turning attention to the subsample of habitations in which MGP ulti-
mately ended up installing solar microgrids, we find results that mirror the
ones presented above. Although statistical significance attenuates for some
coefficients due to a 50% reduction in sample size, we qualitatively come to
the same conclusions regarding the factors that affect technology adoption.
Household expenditures, savings, and entrepreneurship are the most critical
determinants.
Control variables, by and large, do not have strong effects on the adop-
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tion of solar microgrids. While kerosene expenditures on the private market
are estimated to positively affect adoption, as expected, standard errors are
typically large, which prevents us from rejecting the null hypothesis of no
effect of prior fuel expenditures and solar microgrid adoption. The wide con-
fidence intervals are however not too surprising as households with larger
expenditures have a preference for higher energy consumption, driving down
marginal utility less quickly. This unobserved heterogeneity adds uncertainty
to our estimates. Further, even after adoption, MGP’s solar service will not
be sufficient to meet a household’s energy demand due to the microgrids’
limited scope. Households will therefore continue consuming kerosene, which
should weaken the association between kerosene expenditures and microgrid
adoption.
Larger households and households with better educated household heads
seem to be less likely to adopt solar microgrids, pointing at possible limi-
tations of the MGP service especially for households with many members,
most likely due to the small scale nature of the lighting technology offered.
Backward caste households seem to be more likely to adopt when we look at
the full sample, but this effect goes away once we condition on the subsam-
ple in which microgrids were installed. Descriptive statistics in Appendix A3
(Table A6) also show there is no systematic relationship between technology
adoption and habitation level caste composition. Indeed, out of the 25 habi-
tations with MGP microgrids, 9 consist of only backward caste households,
3 are exclusively scheduled caste households, while the remaining 13 have
a mixed caste composition.17 Positive attitudes towards solar power make
adoption more likely: whenever households are convinced that solar power
can decrease lighting cost, this increases chances for adoption.
5. Conclusion
We have presented a general model of household technology adoption
and tailored it to the case of improved household lighting for unelectrified
areas. To estimate the model and test hypotheses about patterns of tech-
17Furthermore, out of 15 homogeneously backward caste habitations, a microgrid is
installed in 9 of while, while six do not adopt; similarly, for 5 scheduled caste only habi-
tations, 3 see a system installed, but 2 do not. Several χ2 of installation status and caste
composition measures do not allow to reject the null hypothesis that caste distributions
are identical across installation and non-installation habitations.
27
nology adoption, we have used data from a field study of solar mircogrids in
rural Uttar Pradesh, India. The results from the empirical analysis highlight
the importance of income effects (affordability of quality lighting) and en-
trepreneurial spirit (willingness to experiment with new technologies), while
pre-existing lighting expenditures on the conventional lighting alternative,
kerosene fuel, appear to be less important as predictors. Similarly, trust in
other people in the community and companies does not predict technology
adoption.
These results suggest productive directions for new research on the eco-
nomics of household technology adoption. While the affordability result is
broadly consistent with conventional accounts, the lack of a relationship be-
tween prior fuel expenditures is surprising and suggests that households do
not view kerosene and solar power as ready substitutes. The importance of
entrepreneurial spirit, but not risk acceptance, suggests that attitudes toward
new technology cannot be reduced to risk aversion but instead constitute an
additional dimension of technology adoption. Further developing and test-
ing these hypotheses in other domains, such as communication technology
or water-purifying equipment, would contribute to progress toward a more
complete theory.
Although the relationship between household characteristics and technol-
ogy adoption cannot be directly tested with experimental methods, we see
several opportunities for causal identification of the effects of the relevant
factors. One interesting approach would be to provide households with a
technology that reduces their fuel expenditures but does not improve light-
ing quality, and then if they are still interested in a wholly new technology
that promises better lighting quality. A behavioral economics approach could
entail priming households to strengthen entrepreneurial spirit and see if such
an intervention would increase technology adoption.
A useful way to interpret the results is to consider the model as a stylized
presentation of the decision-making problem and then assess the empirical
results in light of the significance of different parameters. Our null results
on risk aversion and trust, for example, show that uncertainties surrounding
the quality, durability, and other aspects of basic household technology do
not appear important in the prediction of technology adoption. At the same
time, model parameters related to the size of income effects and, more origi-
nally, entrepreneurial spirit are critical in this context. Theorizing about the
interactions between contextual factors, the nature of the household technol-
ogy under consideration, and the importance of parameters for these various
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dimensions of the problem could contribute toward the development of a full
microeconomic theory of household technology adoption. As we have seen,
such a theory can draw on the adoption of productive (e.g., agricultural)
technology, but the relevant dimensions of the household head’s problem are
quite different and require a modified approach.
Our empirical application also sheds new light on expanding the adop-
tion of off-grid solar power. The importance of entrepreneurial spirit as an
explanation for variation in adoption suggests that households are interested
in using improved lighting for livelihood activities. Complementary interven-
tions, such as access to credit for business creation, could furnish benefits.
We also note that improving the reliability of the energy service could help,
as one-third of the customers initially subscribed to the service and then
dropped it, mostly citing quality issues. Finally, we conjecture that India’s
generous kerosene subsidies could artificially reduce the competitiveness of
solar power as a modern alternative.
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Summary statistics by group
Non-Adopters
Before Intervention After Intervention
Mean SD Mean SD
HH expenditures 8.22 0.56 8.05 0.55
HH savings 4.33 3.39 1.86 3.10
HH in debt 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.50
Entrepreneurial spirit 6.20 2.49 —
Business owner 0.08 0.27 0.06 0.24
Risk aversion (experiment) 2.70 1.31 —
Trust in people (index) 3.56 0.78 3.70 0.84
Trust in firms (index) 3.00 1.13 3.36 1.14
Kerosene spending (PDS) 3.20 1.33 3.26 1.31
Kerosene spending (private) 3.22 2.01 1.96 2.20
HH electrification 0.03 0.18 0.31 0.46
HH size (#) 4.80 2.11 —
Age of HH head 38.70 13.08 —
School years of HH head 2.95 4.18 —
Scheduled caste 0.26 0.44 —
Backward caste 0.61 0.49 —
Lighting satisfaction 1.96 0.85 3.26 0.92
Solar decreases lighting cost 0.74 0.44 0.76 0.43
Adopters
Before Intervention After Intervention
Mean SD Mean SD
HH expenditures 8.31 0.44 8.08 0.51
HH savings 5.09 3.20 2.14 3.32
HH in debt 0.47 0.50 0.55 0.50
Entrepreneurial spirit 6.62 2.20 —
Business owner 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.25
Risk aversion (experiment) 2.61 1.32 —
Trust in people (index) 3.47 0.85 3.74 0.79
Trust in firms (index) 2.87 1.14 3.56 1.05
Kerosene spending (PDS) 3.00 1.42 2.87 1.58
Kerosene spending (private) 3.68 1.82 1.35 2.01
HH electrification 0.04 0.19 0.83 0.38
HH size (#) 4.73 2.23 —
Age of HH head 38.71 14.18 —
School years of HH head 2.53 3.97 —
Scheduled caste 0.17 0.37 —
Backward caste 0.76 0.43 —
Lighting satisfaction 1.98 0.76 3.77 1.08
Solar decreases light. cost 0.85 0.36 0.84 0.37
Table 7: Table 6: Summary statistics for main variables divided by adoption status and
before/after actual adoption. Variables that are time-invariant, slowly varying, measured
only once, or where variation is not meaningful are only reported for the pre-intervention
period.
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Logistic panel regressions: Technology adoption
Full sample Subsample: MGP service installed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model
HH expenditures (rupees/month, log) 2.59∗∗∗ 2.41∗∗∗ 2.29∗∗∗ 2.61∗∗ 5.61∗∗∗ 6.33∗ 5.54∗∗ 4.39∗
(0.77) (0.74) (0.71) (1.21) (3.65) (6.53) (4.15) (3.41)
HH savings (rupees/month, log) 1.19∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗ 1.30∗∗∗ 1.35 1.31∗∗ 1.25∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.12) (0.25) (0.15) (0.11)
HH in debt 0.73 0.71 0.70 0.83 0.83 0.63 0.69 0.91
(0.33) (0.32) (0.33) (0.44) (0.60) (0.52) (0.53) (0.63)
Entrepreneurial spirit 1.19∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗ 1.33∗∗∗ 1.58∗∗ 1.60∗∗∗ 1.51∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.36) (0.22) (0.18)
Business owner 1.13 1.09 0.82 2.08 1.84 1.57
(0.75) (0.73) (0.71) (3.08) (2.33) (1.87)
Risk aversion (experiment) 0.88 0.85 0.95 0.91 0.89 1.04
(0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.27) (0.23) (0.22)
Trust in people (index) 0.74 0.65∗ 0.67 0.64
(0.17) (0.16) (0.25) (0.22)
Trust in firms (index) 0.80 0.74 0.86 0.83
(0.17) (0.18) (0.34) (0.32)
Kerosene spending (PDS, rupees/month, log) 0.93 1.14
(0.15) (0.30)
Kerosene spending (private, rupees/month, log) 1.27 1.25
(0.21) (0.27)
HH electrification 1.28 1.86
(2.03) (1.98)
HH size (#) 0.88 0.84
(0.09) (0.13)
Age of HH head 0.99 0.97
(0.02) (0.03)
School years of HH head 0.87∗∗ 0.91
(0.05) (0.07)
Scheduled caste 1.53 1.24
(2.28) (1.87)
Backward caste 9.26∗∗ 5.42
(8.87) (6.27)
Lighting satisfaction 0.21 0.22
(0.35) (0.48)
Solar power decreases lighting cost 4.21∗∗ 4.29∗
(2.68) (3.56)
Observations 1530 1530 1530 1530 784 784 784 784
Habitations 49 49 49 49 25 25 25 25
Dependent Variable: MGP adoption.
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered by habitation.
All explanatory variables are measured pre-treatment.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 8: Panel models (coefficients as odds-ratios) for full sample (models 1-4) and for
habitations with MGP service (models 5-8).
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